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ABSTRACT
Significant work is being done to develop the math and tools nec-
essary to build provable defenses, or at least bounds, against adver-
sarial attacks of neural networks. In this work, we argue that tools
from control theory could be leveraged to aid in defending against
such attacks. We do this by example, building a provable defense
against a weaker adversary. This is done so we can focus on the
mechanisms of control theory, and illuminate its intrinsic value.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Adversarial Machine Learning has been a research area for over
a decade [24], but has only recently gained increased attention
due to the successful application of adversarial attacks to deep
learning networks [14]. If we define the DNN as a model f (·), which
produces an output y given some input x , then we are interested
in the types of adversarial attacks which can perturb x given some
change ∆ such that the model produces an incorrect decision (i.e.,
f (x) , f (x + ∆)). Typically, it is assumed that the attack parameter
∆ is bounded by some Lp norm, such that ∥∆∥p ≤ ϵ . Adversarial
attacks have been successful in degrading the performance of DNNs
across many domains and algorithms even with very small values of
ϵ [5]. For instance, it has been shown that by altering only one pixel
in the input image, the standard convolutional neural network can
be fooled into making the wrong decision (i.e., ∥∆∥0 ≤ 1) [28]. This
points to the innate vulnerability of DNNs and its negative impacts
on the public trust in reliability and safety of machine learning
systems. As the use of DNNs in safety-critical environments such as
autonomous vehicles [10] and medicine [12] increases, the need for
designing provable defensive solutions against adversarial attacks
also grows. This also motivates our interest in designing robust
deep learning models.
With an increased interest from the community, many attempts
to produce heuristic defensive designs have been proposed [17, 20,
23, 27, 33, 34]. Yet when carefully evaluated, it has been routinely
found that these defensive approaches are not effective against their
intended adversary [3, 4]. Another venue of research has focused
on building provably robust defensive designs against adversarial
attacks. These have so far focused on the careful application of
more sophisticated optimization techniques to prove that every-
thing within an Lp ball of the training data will produce the same
output [1, 9, 15, 31, 32]. While the motivation behind these opti-
mization based approaches is intuitive, the model must be robust if
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the response is consistent, none of these methods can yet scale to
large datasets. Given the shocking nature by which most defensive
designs have been easily defeated [6], many have begun the work
to build a new theory which can help explain and resolve these
issues. This work has been done "from the ground up," and attempts
to build new mathematical tools and results to understand the prob-
lem. Early works provided grounding to the intuitive connection
between model’s accuracy, the dimensionality of the feature space,
and the model’s susceptibility to attack [13]. Wang et al. [29] de-
veloped foundations to compare a trained model f t to an oracle
f o , and provided a connection between extraneous features and
susceptibility to attack. Demontis et al. [8] showed connections
between the norm of the input gradients and the ability to transfer
attacks against one model to a second unknown model.
In this work, we make an important connection between the
field of control theory and the design of robust DNNs. In section 2
we show how to use Lyapunov theory of stability to model neural
networks as a dynamical nonlinear system, and bound the pertur-
bation’s effect against a simple adversary for all possible inputs.
Breifly, we will discuss related work in section 3. An abridged re-
view of the needed control theory, and empirical validation of our
theory, are available in the appendix.
2 MAIN RESULTS
Using the above results from the field of control theory, we show
how to develop a regularization technique that provides provable
bounds for DNN with N layers. The primary result is given in
(1), where ∆(1) is the change in the input of the DNN, which is
constrained such that ∆(1)i = ∆
(1)
j , ∀i, j. ∀l ∈ [2,N ],∆(l ) is the
resulting perturbations to the activation of each proceeding layer
of the network. The constants ϵ , β , can be chosen almost arbitrarily,
so long as the denominator remains positive. A third parameter ρ
must satisfy ρ > cos (π/(N + 1))N+1 ·
(∏N
l=1 νl
)−1
. This shows the
deviations of the network’s final activation (∆(N )) is bounded by a
ratio of the input perturbation size (∆(1)) for all possible inputs.
∥∆(N )∥22 ≤
β ∥∆(1)∥22
2 ·
(
ϵ − ρ − 12β
) (1)
Our proof strategy begins with treating each layer of the DNN
as a nonlinear dynamical system. For each layer, we show the con-
ditions under which the layer obtains the Incrementally Input Feed-
Forward Passive (IIFP) properties (see [35], or Definition 4 ). The
control theory view allows us to consider each layer independently
in our analysis, where the input to one layer is the output of the
previous. Using a sequence of IIFP layers, we then show that their
sequential combination, under certain conditions, will maintain
the Incrementally Output Feedback Passive (IOFP) property (see
[35], or Definition 3). Having the IOFP property allows us to derive
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the global bound given in Equation 1, producing a DNN which is
provably robust against an adversary that can alter the input by
any constant factor. This result can be used both to understand ro-
bustness for classification problems, and the less studied regression
case [25].
2.1 Proving Robustness for the Cascade
Our aim is to find a relationship between the distortions introduced
by adversarial examples and robustness in DNNs. Here, we char-
acterize a measure of robustness which can be used to certify a
minimum performance index against adversarial attacks on a neu-
ral network. Given a DNN, we are interested in characterizing the
(local) robustness of an arbitrary natural example u by ensuring
that all of its neighborhood has the same inference outcome. The
neighborhood of u is characterized by an L2 ball centered at u.
Geometrically speaking, the minimum distance of a misclassified
nearby example tou is the least adversary strength required to alter
the target model’s prediction, which is also the largest possible
robustness certificate for u. We aim to utilize the IIFP and IOFP
properties of the activation function and their relationship with
Lyapunov stability properties of nonlinear systems to find a robust-
ness measure [35]. The definition of the injected perturbations by
the adversary is as follows,
Definition 1. Consider the input u to the layer of size n, u ∈ Rn .
The perturbed input signal is u + ∆ where ∆ ∈ Rn is the attack
vector with all positive or all negative entries of the same size. The
perturbed input vector u is within an ϵ-bounded Lp -ball centered at u
i.e.,u ∈ Bp (u, ϵ), where Bp (u, ϵ) := {u+∆| ∥u+∆−u∥p = ∥∆∥p ≤ ϵ}.
Here, we consider the constant variations ∆(k), i.e., ∆(k )i = ∆
(k)
j ,
∀i, j, which are injected by the adversary into the initial input or
the signals traveling from a hidden layer to another. A system is
defined as a layer inside the DNN which accepts an input of size
nl−1 (output of the previous layer) and produces an output of size
nl (what is produced after the activationn transformation). We
suggest that DNN’s parameters should be trained so that the output
variations are small for small variations in input u. We treat each
layer of the DNN as a nonlinear dynamical system. We show the
conditions under which a layeris IIFP from its input to its output.
Then, we prove that the interconnection of IIFP layers under certain
conditions is IOFP with a negative ρ and as a result find a bounded
stable and robust relationship between the input and output of the
entire DNN i.e., show that bounded changes applied to the input
produce bounded changes in the output which are upper-bounded
by the changes in the input.
Theorem 1. Consider the cascade interconnection of nonlinear
systems H1, ...,N where N > 2, if each sub-system Hi for i = 1, ...,N
is instantaneously Incrementally Input Feed-Forward Passive (IIFP)
with a storage function Vi and νi > 0 such that,
ÛVi = ω(ui2−ui1,yi2−yi1) = (ui2−ui1)T (yi2−yi1)−νi (ui2−ui1)T (ui2−ui1),
then there exists a positive ρ, where, ρ > cos
( π
N+1
)N+1·(∏Nl=1 νl )−1.
for which the entire cascade interconnection of nonlinear systems
admits a storage function of the form,
V =
N∑
i=1
diVi , (2)
satisfying
ÛV ≤ −ϵyTy + ρyTNyN + u1yN , (3)
for some ϵ > 0, where y = [y12 −yT11,y22 −yT21, . . . ,yN 2 −yTN 1]T ,
and ui2 −ui1 and yi2 −yi1 are the incremental inputs and outputs of
system i .
Proof: The proof is to show that the cascade interconnection of
the systems is IOFP with the passivity index −ρ. We need to show
that the storage function given in (2) satisfies (3), where ÛVi ≤ (ui2 −
ui1)T (yi2 −yi1) −νi (ui2 −ui1)T (ui2 −ui1), and ui = ui2 −ui1 is the
incremental difference between any two input signals to the layer
(system) i , and yi = yi2 −yi1 is the incremental difference between
their respective outputs for the layer (system) i .u1 = u12−u11 is the
incremental input to the first layer (system), and yN = yN 2 − yN 1
is the final incremental output of the cascade interconnection and
y is a vector of size N ∗ 1 with incremental output entries yi where
i = 1, ...,N . The relationship given in (3) holds if,
N∑
i=1
[di (uTi yi − νiuTi ui )] − ρyTNyN − u1yN ≤ −ϵyTy. (4)
We can define,
A =

−ν1 0 . . . 0 − 1ρ
1 −ν2
. . . 0
0 1 −ν3
. . .
...
...
. . .
. . .
. . . 0
0 . . . 0 1 −1

, ρi > 0,νi > 0,
and D = diaд{ρ,d1,d2, . . . ,dn }. Then it can be seen that the left
hand-side of (4) is equal to
[uTyT ]DA
[
u
y
]
=
1
2 [u
TyT ][DA +ATD]
[
u
y
]
where y = [(y12 − y11)T , . . . , (yN 2 − yN 1)T ]T . According to The-
orem 5 if, ρ > cos
( π
N+1
)N+1 · (∏Nl=1 νl )−1, then there exists a
diagonal matrix D > 0 such that DA +ATD < 0. Hence, it can be
shown that the left size of the equation given in (4) is negative, i.e.,
[uTyT ]DA
[
u
y
]
< −ϵyTy and thus, ÛV ≤ −ϵyTy + ρyTNyN + u1yN .
We have formulated the storage function, given in (3), for the
cascade of systems H1...N . As mentioned before, each system Hi
represents a layer inside the DNN and the entire cascade inter-
connection represents the entire DNN. Now, we can characterize
a relationship between the incremental inputs fed into the first
layer of DNN and the respective incremental outputs at the final
layer of the DNN. This means that we can effectively characterize
the changes caused by adversarial attacks by quantifying their ef-
fects on the output of DNN. We can prove an upper-bound for the
changes occurring at the output layer of the DNN given the respec-
tive input differences fed into the network. Needless to say, these
input differences are caused by adversarial attacks. Consequently,
2
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we characterize a measure of robustness for the entire DNN. As
shown in the next corollary, if the loss function is designed such
that it is encouraged for each hidden layer of the DNN to behave
as an IIFP nonlinear system then the changes in the output caused
by the attack vector ∆(i) injected by the adversary into the input
of the layer i are bounded and limited by the changes in the input
signal itself (the norm of the attack parameter). Correspondingly,
the adversary’s ability to change the output behavior is limited to
the use of larger attack parameters which in return are easier to
detect.
Corollary 2. Consider a cascade of H1, ...N nonlinear systems
organized as feed-forward layers of a neural network, with N > 2
layers. If each sub-system Hi is instantaneously Incrementally Input
Feed-Forward Passive (IIFP) with a positive incremental input passivity
index νi > 0, then the entire cascade of systems is instantaneously
Incrementally Output Feedback Passive (IOFP) with the passivity index
−ρ and the storage functionw(x ,y) = −ϵyTy+ρyTNyN +u1yN where
ρ meets the condition, ρ > cos (π/(N + 1))N+1 ·
(∏N
i=1 νi
)−1
. One
can show that the variations in the final output of the entire network
(∆(N )) are upper-bounded (limited) by the variations in the input
signal (∆(1)) through the following relation,(
ϵ − ρ − 12β
)
∥∆(N )∥22 ≤
β ∥∆(1)∥22
2 ,
or further as a tighter bound, for all the output variations for all the
layers, we can show the following bound, where ϵ > 0, β > 0 and
[ϵ − ρ − 12β ] > 0.
ϵ ·
N−1∑
i=2
∥∆(i)∥22 +
(
ϵ − ρ − 12β
)
∥∆(N )∥22 ≤
β ∥∆(1)∥22
2
Proof: Given Theorem 1, and the following definitions, ∆(N ) =
yN = yN 2−yN 1, ∆(i) = yi = yi2−yi1 and ∆(1) = u = u1+∆(1)−u1,
we have,
0 ≤ −ϵyTy + ρyTNyN + u1yN
≤ −ϵ ·
N∑
i=1
∥∆(i)∥22 + ρ∥∆(N )∥22
≤ −ϵ ·
N∑
i=1
∥∆(i)∥22 + ρ∥∆(N )∥22 −
(√
βu√
2
− ∆
(N )√
2β
)2
+
β ∥u∥22
2 +
∥∆(N )∥22
2β
≤ −ϵ ∥∆(N )∥22 + ρ∥∆(N )∥22 +
β ∥u∥22
2 +
∥∆(N )∥22
2β
where ϵ > 0, β > 0 are design parameters and ρ > cos(
π
N+1 )N+1
ν1×ν2 · · ·×νN .
Finally if we move the appropriate terms to the left side of the above
inequalities we have,(
ϵ − ρ − 12β
)
∥∆(N )∥22 ≤
βu2
2 =
β ∥∆(1)∥22
2 .
Or further as a tighter bound we can have,
ϵ ·
N−1∑
i=2
∥∆(i)∥22 +
(
ϵ − ρ − 12β
)
∥∆(N )∥22 ≤
β ∥∆(1)∥22
2
where
(
ϵ − ρ − 12β
)
> 0 should hold.
2.2 Proving Bounds Against Perturbations
A DNN can be represented as a cascade of systems. One can model
the DNN as yl = fl (Wlul−1 + bl ) for l = 1, ...,N for some N > 2,
where ul−1 ∈ Rnl−1 is the input feature of the l-th layer, fl :
Rnl−1 → Rnl is a (non-linear) activation function, andWl ∈ Rnl×nl−1
and bl ∈ Rnl are respectively the layer-wise weight matrix and bias
vector applied to the flow of information from the layer l − 1 to l .
nl−1 andnl represent the number of neurons in layers l−1 and l . For
a set of parameters, Θ = {Wl ,bl }Nl=1, we denote the function repre-
senting the entire DNN as fΘ(u(1)) = u(N ) where fΘ : Rn1 → RnN .
Given the training data, (ui ,yi )Ki=1, where ui ∈ Rn1 and yi ∈ RnN ,
the loss function is defined as 1K L(fΘ(ui ),yi ), where L is usually
selected to be cross-entropy or the squared L2-distance for classi-
fication and regression tasks, respectively. The model parameter
to be learned is Θ. We consider how we can obtain a model that
is insensitive to the perturbation of the input. The goal is to ob-
tain a model, Θ, such that the L2-norm of the incremental change
f (u1 + ∆) − f (u1) is small, where u1 ∈ Rn1 is an arbitrary vector
and ∆ ∈ Rn1 is a perturbation vector with a small L2-norm. Most
DNNs exhibit nonlinearity only due to the activation functions,
such as ReLU, maxout and maxpooling. In such cases, function
fΘ is a piece-wise linear function. Hence, if we consider a small
neighborhood of u, we can regard fΘ as a linear function. In other
words, we can represent it by an affine map, u →WΘ,uu + bΘ,u ,
using a matrix,WΘ,u ∈ Rn1×nL , and a vector, bΘ,u ∈ RnL , which
depend on Θ and u. It is important to note that because of Theorem
5, the number of layers in the DNN under consideration should be
larger than 2 (N > 2). This does not limit our results as any DNN
with a smaller number of layers will only consist of an input and
an output layer.
We suggest that model parameterΘ should be trained so that the
output variations are small for small variations in inputu. To further
investigate the property ofWΘ,u , we assume that each activation
function, fl is a modified version of element-wise ReLU called the
Leaky ReLU: fl (ul−1) = max(yl ,a ·yl ) where yl =Wlul−1 +bl , and
0 < a < 1. It follows that, to bound the variations in the output
of the neural network by the variations in the input, it suffices to
bound these variations for each l ∈ {1, ...,L}. Here, we consider
that the variations ∆ are injected by the adversary into the initial
input or the signal traveling from a hidden layer to another. This
motivates us to consider a new form of regularization scheme,
which is described in the following. As mentioned before, a system
is defined as a layer inside the DNN which accepts an input of size
nl−1 (output of the previous layer) and produces an output of size
nl (what is produced after the Leaky ReLu transformation).
The transformations between the two layers l − 1 and l can be
divided into two sub-transformations which respectively represent
the set of row operations done on the input signal that produce
positive or negative outputs on the other side of the Leaky ReLU
activation function. The positive transformation includes the rows
[fl (ul−1)]n+ = [W n+l un
+
l−1 + b
n+
l ] ≥ 0 and the negative transforma-
tion includes the rows [fl (ul−1)]n− = [(W n−l un
−
l−1+b
n−
l )] < 0where
3
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n+ + n− = nl . Below, if the consecutive layers l and l − 1 are of dif-
ferent sizes, the appropriate matrices are padded with zeros. These
changes do not affect our results and are only done for mathemati-
cal tractability. If nl−1 > nl , thenWl is padded with rows of zero
i.e.W ∈ Rnl−1×nl−1 and the identity matrix I has the dimensions of
I ∈ Rnl−1×nl−1 . If nl−1 < nl , thenWl is padded with columns of zero
i.e.Wl ∈ Rnl×nl , the identity matrix initially of size I ∈ Rnl−1×nl−1
is padded with rows and columns of zero to produce I ∈ Rnl×nl
and the ∆(l−1) vector initially of size ∆(l−1) ∈ R1×nl−1 is padded
with rows of zero to produce ∆(l−1) ∈ R1×nl . We need to first show
the conditions under which the non-linear transformations inside
the DNN are IIFP each with a positive input passivity index ν > 0.
As a result, the input passivity index for the layer l , νl is a positive
design parameter representing the extend to which, we want to
encourage this behavior in the sub-layer l . These parameters will
re-appear in the loss function for the entire system to encourage
this behavior on the network level.
Given the Definition 4, and the fact that what happens at the
output level constitutes a linear transformation, we have,
ω(ul−1 + ∆(l−1) − ul−1, f (Wl [ul−1 + ∆(l−1)] + bl ) − f (Wlul−1 + bl ))
= (∆(l−1))TΛWl∆(l−1) − (∆(l−1))T νl I∆(l−1)
= (∆(l−1))TΛWl∆(l−1) − nl−1νl (∆(l−1))T ∆(l−1) (5)
for some positive νl ∈ R. Λ ∈ Rmax (nl ,nl−1)×max (nl ,nl−1) is a diago-
nal matrix defined as follows: the first n+ diagonal entries are equal
to 1, the next n− diagonal entries are equal to a and the rest of the
max(nl ,nl−1)−n+−n− diagonal entries are zeros. The relationship
given in (5) can be further simplified to have,
ω(ul−1 + ∆(l−1) − ul−1, f (Wl [ul−1 + ∆(l−1)] + bl ) − f (Wlul−1 + bl ))
= (∆(l−1))TΛWl∆(l−1) − nl−1νl (∆(l−1))T ∆(l−1)
= [
n+∑
i=1
nl−1∑
j=1
wli j + a
n−∑
i=1
nl−1∑
j=1
wli j ](∆(l−1))T ∆(l−1) − nl−1νl (∆(l−1))T ∆(l−1)
≥ a[
n+∑
i=1
nl−1∑
j=1
wli j +
n−∑
i=1
nl−1∑
j=1
wli j ](∆(l−1))T ∆(l−1) − nl−1νl (∆(l−1))T ∆(l−1)
≥ 0
The above relation holds and as a result the above transformations
are IIFP, if the summation of the weights (entries ofW ) is greater
than nl−1 × νla , i.e., (
∑nl
i=1
∑nl−1
j=1 w
l
i j ) > nl−1 × νla .
As a result a regularization scheme that would encourage the
layers to behave as IIFP nonlinear systems should encourage the
following relation for each layer,
©­«
nl∑
i=1
nl−1∑
j=1
wli j
ª®¬ > nl−1 × νla For l = 1, ...,N . (6)
where nl−1 is the number of neurons in the previous layer, nl is the
number of neurons in the next layer and N is the number of hidden
layers. The above regularization rule on the weights is happening at
the layer level independent of other layers, unlike Ridge or LASSO
regularization rules. A simple regularization rule added to the loss
function that encourages the behavior given in (6) will maintain the
IIFP property for each layer and the IOFP property with a negative
ρ for the entire DNN as defined in Theorem 1. Finally, the variations
in the final output of the entire network (∆(N )) is upper-bounded
(limited) by the variations in the input signal (∆(1)) through the
following relation,(
ϵ − ρ − 12β
)
∥∆(N )∥22 ≤
β ∥∆(1)∥22
2
Or similarly as a tighter bound, for all the output variations at all
the layers we have (7), where (ϵ − ρ − 12β ) > 0. We point out that
the view of DNNs as a non-linear system Hi, ...,N does not depend
on any special properties, or even recognition that the network has
a final layer. As such, the bounds apply to all layers simultaneously,
bounding an attack initiated at any individual layer, as well as the
response of any hidden layer. This type of result has never been
previously shown, and comes for free with control theory.
ϵ ·
N−1∑
i=2
∥∆(i)∥22 +
(
ϵ − ρ − 12β
)
∥∆(N )∥22 ≤
β ∥∆(1)∥22
2 (7)
3 RELATEDWORK
While we are not aware of any prior work that has shown the direct
applicability of control theory to adversarial attacks, we make note
of two types of connections to prior work.
First, Zantedeschi et al. [36] developed a bounded (or "clamped")
version of the ReLU activation function as a method of bounding the
perturbation of the network independent of the learned network’s
weights. By doing so they show ∀u1,∆1, ∥∆N ∥22 ≤ M ∥∆1∥22 where
M =
∏N
j=1Mj is the product of the Lipschitz constants of each
layer. This can be seen as an special case of our results where the
parameters are selected such that β2(ϵ−ρ− 12β )
= M .
Second, we note as an example the valuable work of Zhang
et al. [37], who developed bounds on a network’s response with a
variety of activation functions. In the parlance of control theory,
their work shows similar bounded conic behavior as what we have
performed in this work. In contrast to their work, our approach
leverages control theory to define the behavior of the network as a
whole, allowing us to derive results in a more direct fashion. Our
hope is that by further leveraging and framing these problems in a
control theoretic context, we can simplify the issue of dealing with
adversarial attacks.
4 CONCLUSION
We have, by example, shown how the findings from the field of
control theory, and more specifically Lyapunov theory of stability
and robustness, are directly applicable and thus related to a new
found interest in adversarial attacks. Through this lens, we can
more easily define the behavior of networks as a whole, resulting
in bounded behavior for all possible inputs. While we do not by
any means solve the issue of adversarial attacks in this work, we
hope to have effectively illustrated the deep connection between
these two fields.
4
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A MATHEMATICAL REFERENCE
Our work is based on the Lyapunov theory of stability and robust-
ness for nonlinear dynamical systems, which emerges from the
field of control theory. We recognize many in the machine learning
community are not as familiar with this domain of research. Here,
we give a brief overview of the mathematical principles behind
our results and the proposed approach for designing robust DNNs.
For a more complete background on stability and robustness of
nonlinear systems in the field of control theory, we refer the reader
to [21].
In our work, we consider the nonlinear system H given in Fig. 1,
H :
{
Ûx(t) = f (x(t),u(t))
y(t) = h(x(t),u(t)),
where x(t) ∈ X ⊆ Rn , u(t) ∈ U ⊆ Rm , and y(t) ∈ Y ⊆ Rm are
respectively the state, input and output of the system, and X ,U and
Y are the state, input and output spaces.
Remark 1: Any layer inside a DNN may be seen as a nonlinear
system as described above. For the layer l , u(t) has the size of the
layer l − 1 and stands for the input to the layer before the weights
and biases are applied. y(t) has the size of layer l and may be seen
as the output of the layer l after the activation functions. In this
vein, h and f may be thought of as functions which model the state
changes (x(t)) occurring during the training of the DNN and their
relationship to the input and output signals.
Definition 2. ([35]) System H is instantaneously incrementally
finite-gain Lp -stable, if for any two inputs u1,u2 ∈ U , there exists a
positive gain γ , such that the relation,
∥y2 − y1∥Lp ≤ γ ∥u2 − u1∥Lp .
holds. Here, ∥y2 −y1∥Lp and ∥u2 −u1∥Lp represent the Lp Frobenius
norm of the signals and p may be any positive number.
Remark 2: Note that the property defined in Definition 2 is
less restrictive than assuming Lipschitz continuity for a DNN. The
Lipschitz property corresponds to replacing the right side of the
above equation with a function of input difference i.e., G(| |u2 −
u1 | |Lp )which is linear in | |u2−u1 | |Lp . Further, the above assumption
does not place any constraints on the initial conditions of the system
DNN. This potentially allows for producing model distributions
which have disconnected support [11].
Definition 3. ([35]) SystemH is considered to be instantaneously
Incrementally Output Feedback Passive (IOFP), if it is dissipative with
respect to the well-defined supply rate,
ω(u2 − u1,y2 − y1) = (u2 − u1)T (y2 − y1) − ρ(y2 − y1)T (y2 − y1),
for some positive ρ ∈ R.
Definition 4. ([35]) SystemH is considered to be instantaneously
Incrementally Input Feed-Forward Passive (IIFP), if it is dissipative
with respect to the well-defined supply rate,
ω(u2 − u1,y2 − y1) = (u2 − u1)T (y2 − y1) − ν (u2 − u1)T (u2 − u1),
for some positive ν ∈ R.
OutputInput
Figure 1: A nonlinear system H .
Remark 3: A well-defined supply rate function is one that is
finite over time and meets certain conditions. System H is dissi-
pative with respect to the well-defined supply rate ω(u(t),y(t)),
if there exists a nonnegative storage function V such that ÛV =
ω(u2 − u1,y2 − y1) ≥ 0. Hence, in order to show that a system
is IIFP or IOFP, we need to show that the system’s supply rate is
greater or equal to zero. For more details on this subject, we refer
the readers to [30]. Lastly, the IIFP and IOFP properties of a system
have a direct relationship with the system’s robustness and stability
properties. By proving these properties for each layer of the DNN,
we are effectively encouraging the same robust behavior for the
entire DNN.
Theorem 3. ([21]) If the dynamical system H is Incrementally
Output Feedback Passive (IOFP) with ρ > 0, then it is incrementally
finite-gain L2-stable with the gain γ = 1ρ .
Theorem 4. ([2]) A matrix A ∈ Rn×n is said to be Lyapunov
diagonally stable, if there exists a diagonal matrix D > 0 such that
DA +ATD < 0.
Theorem 5. ([2]) A matrix of the form:
A =

−α1 0 . . . 0 −βN
β1 −α2
. . . 0
0 β2 −α3
. . .
...
...
. . .
. . .
. . . 0
0 . . . 0 βN−1 −αN

,
Where ∀i ∈ [1,N ] s.t. N > 2,αi > 0, βi > 0, is Lyapunov diagonally
stable, i.e. it satisfies the relation given in Theorem 4 for some matrix
D > 0, if and only if the secant criterion,
β1 × β2 × · · · × βN
α1 × α2 × · · · × αN < sec
( π
N
)N
=
1
cos
( π
N
)N
holds.
Remark 4: It is important to note that the properties given in
above theorems will be utilized in our proofs to show stability and
robustness for a cascade of layers in a DNN.
B EMPIRICAL EXPERIMENTS
The primary purpose of our paper is to show, by example, the con-
nection of control theory to adversarial attacks. Having bounded
the deviation of a network’s activation’s given a constant perturba-
tion to the input, we now show this holds empirically and can be
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adapted into a regularize with little work. Because our adversary is
constraint to a single constant perturbation, this is of little practical
importance. It however is indicative of how more involved applica-
tions of control theory may be adapted into usable defenses, and
empirically confirms our proof holds.
The regularization term defined in (8) directly from the proof. It is
composed of layer dependent penalties, each with two components.
A "constant" term that is determined by the values of the hyper
parameters (νl , the Leaky ReLU slope a, and hidden layer size nl )
which are defined before training starts. Subtracted from this is a
"weight" term, which is simply the sum of all weight coefficients for
the hidden layer. The penalty simply encourages the sum of weights
in layer l to be larger than the layer-wise constant nl−1 · vl · a−1.
N∑
l=1
max
©­­­­­­­­«
nl−1 · νl · a−1︸          ︷︷          ︸
Constant term
−
nl∑
i=1
nl−1∑
j=1
wli j︸       ︷︷       ︸
Weight term
, 0
ª®®®®®®®®¬
(8)
B.1 Dataset Details
Experiments were run on the following regression datasets. Prior
to use, each dataset was split into training, validation, and test sets.
The independent variables for each dataset were normalized using
training set statistics, and principal component analysis was used to
reduce the dimensionality of each dataset to 10. The target variable
for each dataset was also scaled to the [0, 1] range. All data sets
were obtained from the UCI Machine Learning repository.
Boston Housing: the first dataset we evaluate on is the Boston
house price data of Harrison and Rubinfeld [18], the target variable
is the median value in thousands of dollars of owner-occupied
homes in the area of Boston, Massachusetts.
Communities and Crime: the second data set we evaluate on is the
Communities and Crime Unnormalized data set [26]. The number
of murders in 1995 is the target variable, and variables include
potential factors such as percent of housing occupied, per capita
income, and police operating budget. Independent variables from
the original data set that contained missing values were dropped.
Relative Location of CT Slices on Axial Axis: the third data set we
evaluate on is the Relative Location of CT Slices on Axial Axis data
set [16]. The data consists of a set of 53500 CT images from 74 differ-
ent patients where each CT slice is described by two histograms in
polar space. The histograms describe the location of bone structures
in the image and the location of air inclusions inside of the body.
The independent variables consist of the information contained in
the two histograms, and the target variable is the relative location
of an image on the axial axis.
Malware: The fourth data set we evaluate on is the Dynamic
Features of VirusShare Executables data set from Huynh et al. [19]
which contains the dynamic features of executables collected by
VirusShare between November 2010 and July 2014. The target vari-
able is a risk score between 0 and 1. This data set is an intrinsically
interesting use case as malware authors are an active real-life ad-
versary.
Condition Based Maintenance: The fifth data set we evaluate
our approach on is the Condition Based Maintenance of Naval
Propulsion Plants data set consists of results from a numerical
simulator of a naval vessel characterized by a gas turbine propulsion
plant [7]. This data set has two target variables, the gas turbine’s
compressor decay state coefficient and the gas turbine’s turbine
decay state coefficient. As such we will treat this as two different
regression data sets that use the same feature set.
B.2 Network Architecture, Training, and
Attack Settings
The network architectures in all experiments consist of an input
layer, 2, 6, or 12 hidden layers of size equal to the input layer size,
and a single node output layer. Leaky rectified linear units were
used as hidden layer activation functions with the negative slope
set to a = 0.5, and Adam was used as the optimization algorithm
[22]. The regularization term from (8) was re-scaled to receive a
weight (i.e., magnitude) equal to the mean squared error in the
loss function. This was to avoid numerical issues in training. In
all cases, the hyper-parameter νl is set to 1, i.e. νl = 1.0 for l =
1, ...,N . While training with gradient descent in this fashion does
not guarantee that the conditions will be met for νl = 1 for l =
1, ...,N , in practice the results are close, with more details shown in
appendix subsection B.4. The adversarial attack follows Definition 1
with ϵ = 0.5. Because of the constraint ∆(1)i = ∆
(1)
j , ∀i, j , our threat
model results in an adversary with a single degree of freedom. We
are aware this is a weaker threat model, but our focus is to show
the connections between the Lyapunov theory and the domain of
adversarial attacks. It also allows us to use Hill climbing to find the
optimal perturbation vector within the ϵ-bounded Lp -ball.
B.3 Results and Discussion
Bounds for each dataset and network depth combination are com-
puted by finding the largest values of νl for each layer satisfying
Equation 6 and the learned weights parameters.
Figure 2 shows a box plot describing the distribution of | |∆
(N ) | |22
| |∆(1) | |22
for each dataset and network depth combination. Red dots represent
the upper bound on the ratio, computed as β2(ϵ−ρ− 12β )
. This plot
illustrates the fact that no bound violations occurred in any of our
experiments. For all test data points, datasets, and network depths,
| |∆(N ) | |22
| |∆(1) | |22
is lower than the upper bound.
For many of the datasets, there is a wide gap between the worst
observed perturbations resulting from an attack and the upper
bound on the perturbations. The presence of large gaps suggests
that there could be a difference between the bound on the universe
of all possible data (what our theory provides) and the space oc-
cupied by observed data. This suggests room for tighter bounds
by looking at the behavior of the network within a limited input
space defined by the data. However, in some cases such as on the
CBM Turbine dataset with 6 hidden layers, the gap is much smaller,
demonstrating that bounding the worst case scenario does have
practical value as it is possible in practice to get very close to the
worst case.
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Figure 2: Box plot describing the distribution of | |∆
(N ) | |22
| |∆(1) | |22
for each dataset and network depth combination. Red dots represent
the upper bound on the ratio, based on Equation 1.
B.4 Learn νl are close to the desired value.
Figure 3 contains a histogram illustrating the distribution of νl
computed from the trained networks combined across all datasets
and network depths using Equation 6. As described in Section B, in
the regularization term the desired νl were set to νl = 1.0 for all
layers in all networks. This figure shows that the resulting νl are
almost all equal or slightly greater than 1.0, noting that larger νl
result in more resilient networks. This demonstrates the practical
effectiveness of the regularization term defined in (8) at obtaining
networks with a specified desired resilience.
It would be possible to force the chosen value of νl = 1 to occur in
the network by using a projection step after every gradient update.
Not only is this more computationally demanding, but we find it
makes learning a network with comparable MSE more difficult.
Because we see that the learn value of νl is almost always closer to
the desired value, we prefer to train in this relaxed fashion, and can
be seen as a way of allowing the network flexibility to reduce the
bound in order to obtain a useful model. This is reasonable in our
opinion, since a model with degenerate performance in all cases is
intrinsically never useful.
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